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ARTICLE
PROBLEMS OF CLASSIFICATION
William C. Duncan†
I. INTRODUCTION
When the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that
Massachusetts’ marriage law was unconstitutional, it offered as a rationale
that defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman lacked any
rational basis.1 This court’s finding of irrationality allowed the court to
avoid the question of whether marriage laws discriminated against a
protected category like sex or “sexual orientation.”2 Given the difficulty of
showing that a marriage law that treats men and women precisely the same
is a form of sex discrimination or showing that a law that completely
ignores the subjective attractions of the parties is sexual orientation
discrimination, one can understand the reluctance to attempt to establish
either of these propositions, but some courts have nevertheless endeavored
to do so.3
Notwithstanding the Massachusetts’ court’s decision in Goodridge, the
“marriage is irrational” enterprise has suffered some serious blows since
Goodridge. The high courts of Maryland, Washington, and New York have
all ruled that laws defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman are
rationally related to valid state interests.4 In the wake of this trend, three
† Mr. Duncan is the director of the Marriage Law Foundation. He is a graduate of the
J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
1. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003).
2. As will be explained below, the phrase “sexual orientation” as a descriptor of a
cognizable category is problematic. It is also a conclusory formulation, suggesting that an
individual has a fixed “orientation” that defines that individual.
3. Indeed, even among the courts that have mandated either marriage redefinition or
the creation of an equivalent legal status, there has been a significant divergence in
justifications offered. While California (In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 440-41 (Cal.
2008)), Connecticut (Kerrigan v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431-32 (Conn. 2008)),
and Iowa (Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885 (Iowa 2009)) have said marriage is sexual
orientation discrimination, Hawaii (Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 51 n.11 (Haw. 1993)) and
Massachusetts (Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 953 n.11) have said it is not. Hawaii, on the other
hand, said marriage is a form of sex discrimination, but that idea has been rejected by the
high courts of Vermont (Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 n.13 (Vt. 1999)), Massachusetts
(Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961), and California (In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 438-40).
4. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 635 (Md. 2007); Hernandez v. Robles, 855
N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 985 (Wash. 2006).
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recent court decisions on state definitions of marriage have reverted from
the Goodridge theory that marriage is irrational to examining marriage laws
with heightened scrutiny.5 The California Supreme Court held that sexual
orientation is a suspect class,6 and the Connecticut and Iowa supreme courts
have held that it is at least a quasi-suspect class.7 Even the ongoing
challenge to California’s marriage amendment, Proposition 8, relies on a
similar theory—that the amendment unfairly targets a constitutionally
protected class and so must be invalidated by the judiciary.8
The equal protection analysis employed in these decisions and proposed
by the Perry v. Schwarzenegger plaintiffs challenging Proposition 8,
however, does not itself withstand scrutiny for two primary reasons. First,
sexual orientation is difficult to establish as a legal classification. Second,
sexual orientation, even if adequately defined, would be difficult to comport
with the traditional understanding of a protected class. Furthermore, even if
this designation were made, it would mar our constitutional system by
allowing the government to take sides in factious disputes.
This Article will consider each of these points in turn: the nature of the
group, the indicia of suspect class status, and the intention of the
Constitution.
II. WHO’S IN, WHO’S OUT
Creating a legal category of sexual orientation would be deeply
problematic because it is not clear what individuals would fit in the class.
The American Psychological Association (APA) notes that the meaning of
sexual orientation can vary significantly.9 The APA speaks of orientation in
terms of quantifiable factors, such as “behaviors,” but it also relies on
subjective factors such as “a person’s sense of identity.”10
In the literature discussing the topic, there seem to be three primary
definitions of sexual orientation focusing respectively on sexual behavior,

5. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 441-42; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 475-76;
Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 896.
6. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 441-42.
7. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 431-32; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 893.
8. Complaint, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. CV 09-2292 VRW (N.D. Cal. May 22,
2009), available at http://www.equalrightsfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/
2009-05-22_Filed_Complaint.pdf.
9. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS: FOR A
BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HOMOSEXUALITY 1 (2008),
http://www.apa.org/topics/sexuality/sorientation.pdf.
10. Id.
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sexual attraction, or self-identification.11 These factors are, of course, not
exclusive, and within each category there are also significant variations. For
example, if homosexuality is defined behaviorally (e.g., “men who have sex
with men”) does the class of gay men include any man who reports ever
having sex with a man? If it does not, would it include those who reported a
sexual relationship in the last five years or the last year with a person of the
same sex?12 In short, the question of behavior is a slippery measure of
orientation.
If orientation is defined instead by desire or attraction, do we use
physical (i.e., sexual) or romantic (i.e., emotional) attraction as the primary
criterion?13 In addition, attraction typically exists on a continuum with
many individuals recognizing some degree of attraction to both sexes.14 If a
man identifies himself as a two or a three on a scale in which one represents
“only attracted to men” and seven represents “only attracted to women,” is
he gay or straight or something else?15 Some studies suggest that a large
number of women who identify themselves as lesbian, for instance, have
had a sexual relationship with at least one man in their lifetimes.16 This
undercuts the idea that sexual orientation can be determined solely on
attraction criteria.
A seemingly clearer definition of sexual orientation would rely on selfidentification, so that people would be considered part of the class of gays
or lesbians only if they adopted that social identity.17 Of course, neither the
State nor any other person would be able to detect or refute the
classification because it would be a purely subjective decision. The
significance of the problem associated with this type of definition is
highlighted by the Iowa Supreme Court’s holding that marriage was a form
of sexual orientation discrimination notwithstanding the fact that the state’s
marriage law, by not expressly prohibiting gay or lesbian persons from
marrying, took no cognizance of the subjective attractions, sexual behavior,

11. EDWARD O. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL
PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 290 (1994); see also Transcript of Proceedings at 2055-56,
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. C 09-2292 VRW (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.telladf.org/userdocs/PerryTrialTranscript9.pdf (testimony of Gregory Herek).
12. LAUMANN ET AL., supra note 11, at 294-95.
13. Id. at 297.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 293, 297.
16. Allison L. Diamant et al., Lesbians’ Sexual History with Men, 159 ARCH. INTERNAL
MED. 2730 (1999), available at http://archinte.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/159/22/2730.
17. See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 9.
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or self-identification of prospective spouses.18 The court found this reality
was irrelevant because it believed “civil marriage with a person of the
opposite sex is as unappealing to a gay or lesbian person as civil marriage
with a person of the same sex is to a heterosexual.”19 The court offered no
evidence for this assertion, and it seems unlikely it could have, since at the
very least, people who are in same-sex marriages sometimes have
previously been married to a person of the opposite sex.20 Moreover, people
who identify as gay or lesbian may still choose at some point to marry a
person of the opposite sex.21
Sexual orientation as a category stands in striking contrast to categories
like race or sex traditionally subject to heightened scrutiny by the courts.22
The classification of people who are considered to be “gay or lesbian” will
shift depending on the various methods a court may choose to adopt in
defining the terms, which may or may not be based on the selfidentification of the litigants. For example, the number of those who could
claim special judicial solicitude due to their sexual orientation could double
or triple solely depending on what criteria is used to identify
homosexuals.23 To see how this could play out, consider the State of Iowa
where marriage has been redefined.24 By applying the national rates of self-

18. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885 (Iowa 2009). This in contrast to the
holdings of the high courts of at least six other states, which held marriage was not a form of
sexual orientation discrimination. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Conaway
v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass. 2003); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864
(Vt. 1999); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006).
19. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 885.
20. GARY J. GATES, M.V. LEE BADGETT & DEBORAH HO, MARRIAGE, REGISTRATION AND
DISSOLUTION BY SAME-SEX COUPLES IN THE U.S. 2 (July 2008) available at
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5tg8147x (reporting that “more than one in five individuals in
same-sex couples who marry or register have previously been married to a different-sex
partner”).
21. Robert L. Spitzer, Can Some Gay Men and Lesbians Change Their Sexual
Orientation? 200 Participants Reporting a Change from Homosexual to Heterosexual
Orientation, 32 ARCH. SEXUAL BEHAV. 403, 407 (2003) (reporting that some individuals
seek to change their sexual orientation because of a desire to marry a person of the opposite
sex).
22. See Andersen, 138 P.3d at 976; United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33
(1996); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
23. See LAUMANN ET AL., supra note 11, at 297.
24. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d 862.
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identifying homosexuals indicated in a Chicago study25 to the population of
Iowa (as of 2008),26 one could calculate that roughly 32,000 men and
16,000 women in Iowa are gay and lesbian, respectively. However, if
homosexuality is defined instead by sexual attraction, the numbers would
be considerably different: approximately 70,000 men and 51,000 women
would be considered gay and lesbian.27 Thus, the number of men and
women who could qualify for special legal protection in the state would
double for men and triple for women under the latter calculation.28
III. CATEGORY ERRORS
The purpose of holding that marriage laws classify on the basis of sexual
orientation is to justify the judiciary in deciding the legal definition of
marriage.29 If the courts conclude that a law employs a classification that is
suspect or quasi-suspect, they do not have to defer to legislative or popular
decisions.30 Instead, they must scrutinize the law more carefully so as to
protect groups who could not be adequately protected in the normal
political process. Race has been one such example; the clear intent of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was to protect racial
minorities from unjust discrimination.31
The courts have adopted a test for determining when other groups can
likewise access heightened judicial involvement in legal controversies
25. LAUMANN ET AL., supra note 11, at 293 (reporting that “2.8 percent of the men and
1.4 percent of the women” surveyed in the U.S. “reported some level of homosexuality (or
bisexual) identity”).
26. Calculating from the U.S. Census Bureau population data, there are roughly
1,131,729 men and 1,159,220 women over the age of 18. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND
COUNTY QUICK FACTS: IOWA (2008), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/19000.html (last
visited Mar. 27, 2010).
27. LAUMANN ET AL., supra note 11, at 297 (reporting that 6.2% of men are at least
“somewhat attracted” to other men, and that 4.4% of women are attracted to other women).
28. These figures represent the percentage indicated in LAUMANN ET AL., supra note 11,
as applied to the totals of men and women reported in the Census.
29. This is because the court can lawfully extend its heightened scrutiny to a “protected
class” that is discriminated against, rather than giving deference to the legislative definition
of marriage.
30. See Hibbs v. HDM Dep’t of Hum. Res., 273 F.3d 844, 857-58 (9th Cir. 2001); see
generally City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) (discussing
heightened scrutiny as applied to racial classifications and refusing to give deference to the
legislature); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985)
(discussing the varying levels of scrutiny and finding that the mentally retarded do not
qualify as a quasi-suspect class).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12
(1967).
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affecting them.32 The courts typically look at whether the group has
experienced a history of discrimination, whether the group is characterized
by an innate and immutable characteristic, and whether the group is
politically powerless.33
Regarding the question of historical discrimination, no one would argue
with the fact that gay and lesbian people have often been treated shamefully
in the past and continue to be so treated. Unfortunately, it is not uncommon
for people to receive poor treatment because of real or perceived
differences from others.34 It is a harder question whether a given class has
been historically disfavored by the law.35 The California, Iowa, and
Connecticut supreme courts found that because each state’s antidiscrimination law included sexual orientation in its covered classes, these
states must have enacted their laws because they were aware of a history of
discrimination.36 This is perhaps a simplistic understanding of the
significance of these statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted,
“according to some scholars the concept of the homosexual as a distinct
category of person did not emerge until the late 19th century.”37 This seems
to suggest that there has not been widespread legal disability imposed on
gay men and lesbians comparable to the disadvantages created by race and
gender discrimination including slavery, segregation laws, and denial of
voting rights. The most urgently pressed “evidence” of legal discrimination
is our inherited understanding of marriage as the union of a man and a
woman; yet, it seems facetious to argue that marriage laws were enacted in
order to subjugate a class of persons based on sexual orientation. This
position is made even more unlikely considering the class only recently
came into being. Furthermore, marriage has long served the purpose of

32. See San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
33. Id.
34. See generally John F. Dovidio et al., Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination:
Another Look, in STEREOTYPES AND STEREOTYPING 276, 276-77 (C. Neil Macrae et al. eds.,
1996); Tonja R. Nansel et al., Bullying Behaviors Among US Youth: Prevalence and
Association with Psychosocial Adjustment, 285 J. A.M.A. 2094 (2001), available at
http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/285/16/2094.
35. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 885 (Vt. 1999) (referring to a “long history of official
intolerance of intimate same-sex relationships”) (emphasis added).
36. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 428 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Dep’t of Pub.
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 447-48 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 889-90
(Iowa 2009).
37. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568 (2003); see also Letitia Anne Peplau, The
Development of Sexual Orientation in Women, 10 ANN. REV. SEX RES. 70, 83 (1999).
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promoting a child’s bond with both biological parents.38 The question of
historical discrimination is thus not as compelling as it might appear.
The second factor that courts will consider concerns the innate and
immutable characteristics of the class; however, this factor also presents a
problem for sexual orientation. A recent study notes that the effort to
establish genetic or hormonal effects on sexual orientation has been
“inconclusive at best.”39 Thus, “the assertion that homosexuality is genetic
is so reductionistic that it must be dismissed out of hand as a general
principle of psychology.”40 Especially for women, “there is little evidence
that biological factors are a major determinant of women’s sexual
orientation.”41 The authors of a recent article point out that “[a]s samples
become more representative, concordance on sexual behavior, attraction,
and orientation, as expected, declines.”42 These authors’ study of same-sexattracted individuals used a large, nationally representative sample of teens
in school and found that concordance rates for identical twins were only
6.7%, about the same as for fraternal twins (7.2%).43 The authors also point
out that other research suggests “substantial heritability for caring for
tropical fish (28%), and frequency of various behaviors such as purchasing
folk music in the past year (46%), chewing gum (58%), and riding a taxi
(38%).”44 They conclude by finding “no support for genetic influences on
same-sex preference net of social structural constraints” and “substantial
indirect evidence in support of a socialization model at the individual
level.”45 Maryland’s highest court has said:
Based on the scientific and sociological evidence currently
available to the public, we are unable to take judicial notice that
gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons display readily-recognizable,
immutable characteristics that define the group such that they
38. DAVID BLANKENHORN, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 178 (2007). This proposition will
be further discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 71-72.
39. Peter S. Bearman & Hannah Bruckner, Opposite-Sex Twins and Adolescent SameSex Attraction, 107 AM. J. SOC. 1179, 1180 (2002).
40. RICHARD C. FRIEDMAN & JENNIFER I. DOWNEY, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
PSYCHOANALYSIS: SEXUAL SCIENCE AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 39 (2002).
41. Letitia Anne Peplau & Linda D. Garnets, A New Paradigm for Understanding
Women’s Sexuality and Sexual Orientation, 56 J. SOC. ISSUES 329, 332 (2000); see also
Rosemary C. Veniegas & Terra D. Conley, Biological Research on Women’s Sexual
Orientations: Evaluating the Scientific Evidence, 56 J. SOC. ISSUES 267, 277 (2000).
42. Bearman & Bruckner, supra note 39, at 1184.
43. Id. at 1197-98.
44. Id. at 1185 n.8.
45. Id. at 1199.
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may be deemed a suspect class for purposes of determining the
appropriate level of scrutiny to be accorded the statute in the
present case.46
Futhermore, there is little serious scientific question that individual
identity as straight, gay, or lesbian can and does change. A number of
studies suggest that “changes in sexual feelings and orientation over time
occur in all possible directions.”47 Self-identification seems particularly
fluid for lesbians, with research disclosing women who believe their lesbian
self-identification is more a personal choice than an innate constraint.48
Recent research also suggests that at least a few strongly motivated
individuals can voluntarily change their orientation.49
This question of innateness and immutability surfaced prominently in the
Proposition 8 trial. The plaintiffs’ expert on orientation matters described in
his testimony a study he had conducted that reported eighty-eight percent of
his gay male subjects said “they had no choice at all, with approximately 7
percent saying they had a small amount of choice” and sixty-eight percent
of his lesbian subjects saying they had “no choice at all, and another 15
percent saying a small amount of choice.”50 The contrast to race or gender
should be obvious where color of skin or a person’s sex from birth offers no
choice. The case for innateness and immutability is far from compelling.
46. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 614 (Md. 2007).
47. Joseph P. Stokes et al., Predictors of Movement Toward Homosexuality: A
Longitudinal Study of Bisexual Men, 43 J. SEX RES. 304, 305 (1997); see also Roy F.
Baumeister, Gender Differences in Erotic Plasticity: The Female Sex Drive As Socially
Flexible and Responsive, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 347 (2000); Peplau & Garnets, supra note 41.
48. Karen L. Bridges & James M. Croteau, Once-Married Lesbians: Facilitating
Changing Life Patterns, 73 J. COUNS. & DEV. 135 (Nov./Dec. 1994); Claudette M.
Charbonneau & Patricia S. Lander, Redefining Sexuality: Women Becoming Lesbian in MidLife, in LESBIANS AT MID-LIFE 35 (B. Sang et al. eds., 1991); Lisa Diamond, Development of
Sexual Orientation Among Adolescent and Young Adult Women, 34 DEV. PSYCHOL. 1085
(1998); Lisa Diamond, Was It a Phase? Young Women’s Relinquishment of
Lesbian/Bisexual Identities over a 5-Year Period, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 352
(2003); Lisa Diamond & Ritch Savin-Williams, Explaining Diversity in the Development of
Same-Sex Sexuality Among Young Women, 56 J. SOC. ISSUES 297 (2000); Sari H. Dworkin,
Treating the Bisexual Client, 57 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 671 (2001); Susan Rosenbluth, Is
Sexual Orientation a Matter of Choice?, 21 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 595 (1997).
49. Robert L. Spitzer, Can Some Gay Men and Lesbians Change Their Sexual
Orientation? 200 Participants Reporting a Change from Homosexual to Heterosexual
Orientation, 32 ARCH. SEXUAL BEHAV. 403 (2003).
50. Transcript of Proceedings at 2056, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. C 09-2292 VRW
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2010), available at http://www.telladf.org/userdocs/
PerryTrialTranscript9.pdf.
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Ultimately, the most important factor is the question of political
powerlessness. The members of any class, regardless of whether they have
an innate characteristic or have been subjected to discriminatory treatment,
would need to establish their political powerlessness, or there would exist
no logical justification for judicial solicitude on their behalf.51 However,
this factor is the one that is least convincingly established by the proponents
of heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation.52
It is true that same-sex marriage, like many policy innovations, has not
been rapidly adopted in states.53 The political powerlessness analysis,
however, must require more than just a showing that a policy favored by a
particular group has not been popular.54 To make sense, it must require a
showing of persistent inability to get any kind of fair hearing due to
minority status.55 Otherwise, the judicial review of the normal political
process would be at best premature and at worst an invalid incursion into
the prerogatives of the people and the popular branches.
A summary picture of American law calls into question the assertion of
powerlessness. Some states have redefined marriage through legislative
action.56 Additionally, other “gay rights” efforts have been successful
politically, such as the enactment of civil unions or related legal statuses
that allow same-sex couples to access the benefits of marriage.57 Some
states have both constitutional amendments defining marriage as the union
of a man and a woman and laws creating alternative legal statuses for same51. If indeed, there is any constitutional justification for this judge-created test. As
Professor George Carey explains, “aside from the principle of representation that would
perforce require a legislative body, Madison at no point in Federalist 10 speaks of
constitutional institutions as barriers to factious majorities.” GEORGE W. CAREY, IN DEFENSE
OF THE CONSTITUTION 37 (1989).
52. A more compelling case would be made by a group like the Amish, who typically
do not actively participate in political issues, are a distinct minority, and are not well
represented among legislators, cultural figures, etc.
53. Only five states have redefined marriage, while thirty have enacted constitutional
amendments defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman. See William C. Duncan,
Speaking Up for Marriage, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 915 (2009).
54. Why else would the term be “powerlessness,” denoting a persistent condition rather
than a one-time experience?
55. See High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.3d 563, 574 (9th
Cir. 1990) (political powerlessness can be rebutted by a showing that a group can gain the
attention of the legislature).
56. L.D. 1020, 124th Me. State Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2009); H.R. 436, 2009 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2009); S. 115, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2009).
57. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-2 (West 2007); OR.
REV. STAT. § 99 (2009); H.R. 436, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2009); S. 5688, 2009-2010
Leg., 2009 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009).
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sex couples.58 A number of states now have sexual orientation
discrimination laws59 or include sexual orientation in hate crimes
protection.60 Gay rights activists have been able to significantly influence
elections,61 and advocacy organizations are well-funded and influential.62
Legal changes favorable to gay and lesbian citizens may not be approved
with the rapidity some would desire, but gays and lesbians simply do not
experience the level of political powerlessness experienced by groups like
African-Americans, who were denied the right to vote and made to endure
segregation laws.
In the absence of historical discrimination, immutability, and general
political powerlessness, the only evidence offered for extending heightened
scrutiny is that the proponents of suspect class status and the class they
claim to represent have not obtained a legal redefinition of marriage in
every state or inclusion in every state’s anti-discrimination laws. If this
analysis was adopted in other contexts, any failure to secure a favored result
in a political contest would be de facto evidence of the existence of a
suspect or quasi-suspect class. This would effectively nullify the
constitutional lawmaking process, since any group unsuccessful at the
ballot box would gain special constitutional status just by virtue of losing.
58. For instance, California (CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West
2004)) and Oregon (OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5(a); OR. REV. STAT. § 99 (2009)).
59. See Andrew Harmon & Michelle Garcia, ENDA Possible by Year’s End, THE
ADVOCATE, Aug. 5, 2009, http://www.advocate.com/News/Daily_News/2009/08/04/ENDA_
Possible_By_Year__39;s_End/.
60. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1750 (2004); CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.75 (West 2010);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-121 (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-181j–181l
(2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1304 (2007); D.C. CODE § 22-3701 (2009); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 775.085 (West 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 846-51 (LexisNexis 2007); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.1 (West 2002); IOWA CODE § 729A.1-2 (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 214716(c)(2)(C) (2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.031 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:107.2 (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1151 (2004); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW
§ 10-301 (West 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 39 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. §
363A.03(44) (2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 557.035 (West 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28111 (LexisNexis 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.690 (LexisNexis 2006); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 651:6 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:16-1 (2005); N.M. CODE R. § 31-18B-3
(Weil 2003); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 485.00, 485.05 (McKinney 2008); OR. REV. STAT. §§
166.155, 166.165 (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-38 (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-114
(2002); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.014 (Vernon 2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1455
(2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.080 (West 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.645
(2005).
61. See Joshua Green, They Won’t Know What Hit Them, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 2007, at
76.
62. See, e.g., How Much Do They Make?, WASHINGTON BLADE, Mar. 26, 2009.
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This, of course, would allow courts to act “like some lumbering bully, to
disrupt social norms and practices at its pleasure.”63
IV. FACTIOUS INTERESTS
More promising for evaluating the claims of proponents of heightened
scrutiny for sexual orientation than the Supreme Court’s formulae is James
Madison’s analysis of faction in Federalist No. 10.64 For, as helpful as the
concept of sexual orientation may be for sociological purposes, it is a
distraction in the legal context where matters such as the definition of
marriage must be evaluated on the basis of social interests rather than
identity politics (the political jostling between different groups claiming
preference based on their status). The movement to redefine marriage has
more in common with “a rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts,
for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked
project”65 than with the effort to vindicate the Constitution’s promise of
equal protection of the laws regardless of race.66
James Madison famously describes a faction as “a number of citizens,
whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united
and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to
the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of
the community.”67 In his own version of the innateness concept, he notes
that the “latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man.”68 As
Professor George Carey explains, Madison does not argue that all interest
groups are factions, but rather that a faction is distinguished by “the
oppressive or socially destructive ends which it seeks.”69
To continue with the example of same-sex marriage, successful
accomplishment of that goal would be adverse “to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community.”70 To explain briefly, redefining
marriage would undermine the traditional channeling function of
63. Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 203 (1986).
64. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 43 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., Gideon ed. 2001).
65. Id. at 48.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
67. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 64, at 43.
68. Id.
69. GEORGE W. CAREY, THE FEDERALIST: DESIGN FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC 11
(1989).
70. See William C. Duncan, Marriage and the Utopian Temptation, 59 RUTGERS L.
REV. 265 (2007); William C. Duncan, Marriage on Trial, 12 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 493
(2009); William C. Duncan, Portrait of an Institution, 50 HOW. L.J. 95 (2006).
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marriage—its role in encouraging the ideal of a man and a woman
committing to each other and to any children their relationship, and their
relationship alone, may create.71 It repudiates the inherited social interest in
marriage—ensuring that wherever possible a child will have the
opportunity to know and be raised by his or her own mother and father.72
Instead, it endorses a set of radical propositions: (1) that marriage is about
nothing more than adult desires, (2) that men and women, mothers and
fathers, are fungible and neither is necessary to a child’s well being, and (3)
that the state should be able to co-opt the social institution of marriage for
its own purposes.73
Of course, some will benefit from these changes, but many will not.
Previous cultural shifts demonstrate the challenge. As Christopher Jencks
explains:
Single parenthood began its rapid spread during the 1960s, when
elite attitudes toward sex, marriage, divorce, and parenthood
were undergoing a dramatic change. This change was obvious in
the mass media, in the law, and in the widely publicized
activities of celebrities. In the space of a decade we moved from
thinking that society ought to discourage extramarital sex, and
especially out-of-wedlock births, to thinking that such efforts
were an unwarranted infringement on personal liberty. Instead of
feeling morally superior to anyone who had a baby without
marrying, the young began to feel morally superior to anyone
who disapproved of unwed mothers.74
Jencks notes that many of these cultural changes “in attitudes almost
certainly improved the lives of the educated elite,” but “[f]or less privileged
couples, . . . the demise of traditional norms about marriage and divorce
posed more serious problems.”75 Specifically, “Once the two-parent norm
loses its moral sanctity, the selfish considerations that always pulled poor
parents apart often become overwhelming.”76 Is there any reason to believe
that the cultural signals in same-sex marriage (particularly the primacy of
71. See generally William C. Duncan, The State Interests in Marriage, 2 AVE MARIA L.
REV. 153 (2004).
72. Id.
73. See William C. Duncan, Does the Family Have a Future?, 83 N.D. L. REV. 1273
(2007).
74. Christopher Jencks, Deadly Neighborhoods, NEW REPUBLIC, June 13, 1998, at 23,
28.
75. Id. at 29.
76. Id. at 30.
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adult interests and the commodification of children) will not be taken
seriously and their influence felt by many, including those least equipped to
absorb the consequences? In other words, why would we assume that
society would not take seriously the messages sent by redefining marriage?
James Q. Wilson provides a telling analogy:
Imagine a game of crack-the-whip, in which a line of children,
holding hands, starts running in a circle. The first few children
have no problem keeping up, but near the end of the line the last
few must run so fast that many fall down. Those children who
did not begin the turning suffer most from the turn.77
The effort to secure heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation
classifications is an effort to enlist the judiciary on the side of factious
interests. Thus, it is also adverse “to the rights of other citizens.”78 If
established, the factious aim of same-sex marriage, for instance, would seek
to destroy competing interests by destroying liberties79 and imposing
egalitarianism (ironically, the very way that Madison said the causes of
factions themselves could be removed at a prohibitive cost80).
Madison also explained in Federalist No. 10 how a factious interest can
be countered. For a minority faction, currently the situation for advocates of
same-sex marriage, the majority can “defeat its sinister views . . . by regular
vote.”81 Hence the state marriage amendments and statutes. If the factious
interest gains the support of a majority, the extended republic contemplated
by our Constitution may counter the faction’s aims.82 Herein lies the
problem, however. As Professor Carey notes, the government Madison and
his colleagues contemplated was “a relatively passive government.”83 Since
Madison’s time, “dominant political forces have seen as their main task”
securing “greater economic and social equality,” and this “quest for
equality in all spheres of social life seemingly knows no bounds short of
repealing the laws of nature.”84 Consequently, “the government has
77. James Q. Wilson, Why We Don’t Marry, CITY J., Winter 2002, available at
http://city-journal.org/html/12_1_why_we.html.
78. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 64, at 43.
79. See generally SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS
(Douglas L. Laycock et al. eds., 2008).
80. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 64, at 43.
81. Id. at 45.
82. Id. at 48-49.
83. George W. Carey, The Constitution and Community, in COMMUNITY AND
TRADITION: CONSERVATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 63, 79 (George W.
Carey & Bruce Frohnen eds., 1998).
84. GEORGE W. CAREY, IN DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 48 (1989).

478

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:465

massively intervened in precisely those areas of economic and social life
where it is abundantly clear that the opportunities for factious influence
abound.”85 The centralization of political power at the federal level and in
the judicial branch is one of the most significant barriers to the proper
working of the faction-defeating characteristics of the extended republic,
including the principle of federalism.
Having the definition of marriage “constitutionalized” and made the
exclusive province of the federal courts would neutralize the check against
minority factions. It would ally the courts with the minority faction. It
would also neutralize the checks on majority factions (by removing the
question from the representative branches and eviscerating federalism by
permanently removing the definition of marriage from the states).
All this and more is at stake in the debate over creating a new legal
classification of sexual orientation. It is a question we cannot afford to
answer wrongly.

85. Id.

